



United States v. Flores-Lopez: Protecting Privacy 




The Founders carefully drafted the Fourth Amendment to provide 
protection for “persons, houses, papers, and effects,”
1
 purposefully 
shielding Americans from certain government intrusions.  This protec-
tion of our papers and documents, or “freedom of conscience,”
2
 was of 
the utmost importance to the Founders, as government intrusions were a 
pressing issue in the late 1700s.  Pre-Constitution Americans’ fear of an 
overly intrusive government was exemplified in a pamphlet widely circu-
lated throughout the colonies:
3
 
What then, can be more excruciating torture, than to have [government 
agents] . . . amuse themselves with the perusal of all private letters, 
memorandums, secrets and intrigues . . . . 
. . .  [W]ould any gentleman in this kingdom rest one minute at ease in 
his bed, if he thought, that . . . every secret of his family [was] made 
subject to the inspection of [the government]?
4
 
Recent advances in cellular phone technology have forced courts to 
reconsider the Fourth Amendment’s range of protection.  This Note dis-
cusses the particular situation involving a police officer’s search of an 
arrestee’s cell phone. 
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The search-incident-to-arrest doctrine generally allows a law en-
forcement officer to search items on an arrestee’s person as well as ob-
jects within an arrestee’s immediate control.
5
  This doctrine was devel-
oped to further the legitimate government interests of preservation of 
evidence and officer safety,
6
 but its recent application to electronic de-
vices has proven a weighty endeavor for the lower courts.  While the Su-
preme Court has yet to offer guidance, the issue of how to apply the text 
of the Fourth Amendment to current technology is percolating in the 
lower courts with inconsistent results. 
Adhering to analogous Supreme Court precedent regarding physical 
items
7
 and allowing unconstrained searches of phone data may yield un-
desirable results.  For example, suppose an individual is pulled over by a 
police officer for rolling through a stop sign.  The police officer then 
lawfully arrests the individual for the traffic violation and proceeds to 
search his person, which predictably yields a smartphone.  The officer 
activates the phone and begins perusing its contents—emails, photos, 
browser history, contacts, and text messages.  The officer encounters 
photos of the arrestee’s significant other posing nude in sexually sugges-
tive poses, which the officer shares with his colleagues at the scene.  This 
is precisely what happened in Newhard v. Borders, where the court 
found that the officers did not violate any “‘clearly established’ constitu-
tional right . . . under the Fourth Amendment.”
8
  The officers’ intrusion is 
surely shocking; however, the Supreme Court’s current stance on the 
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine seems to allow this government intru-
sion. 
This Note describes why treating smart phones as traditional physical 
containers is irrational and proposes that cell phone searches incident to 
arrest be treated similar to home searches.  Specifically, the amount of 
highly private data now stored on phones—text messages, bank records, 
medical records, photographs, etc.—justifies the need for a search war-
rant or exceptional circumstances before law enforcement can access a 
phone’s data.  Part II of this Note provides a brief overview of the Fourth 
Amendment and discusses the formation of the search-incident-to-arrest 
                                                          
 5. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969).  
 6. See id. at 763 (discussing the justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine). 
 7. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“[A] search incident to the arrest 
requires no additional justification.”); see also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)  
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doctrine as well as how lower courts have applied the doctrine to cell 
phone searches.  The focal case discussed is United States v. Flores-
Lopez, decided by the Seventh Circuit in February 2012.
9
  In Flores-
Lopez, the court addressed many issues courts commonly face on this 
topic and upheld the warrantless search of an arrestee’s phone to obtain 
the phone’s own number.
10
  This case illustrates how treating phones as 
traditional physical objects does not provide phones with the Fourth 
Amendment protection their contents deserve.  Part III analyzes the Sev-
enth Circuit’s decision, cautions against extending the Supreme Court’s 
recent holding in Arizona v. Gant
11
 to cell phone searches, and argues for 
increasing the protection of cell phone data by treating a phone similar to 
a house for Fourth Amendment purposes. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Fourth Amendment: Warrant and Reasonableness Requirements 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vi-
olated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
12
 
Based on this text, searches conducted “outside the judicial process” 
violate the warrant clause and are presumptively unreasonable, with sev-
eral exceptions.
13
  Judicial approval for a search “interpose[s] a magis-
trate between the citizen[s] and police” because “the right of privacy [is] 
deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the 
detection of crime . . . .”
14
  The United States Supreme Court has repeat-
edly expressed its “strong preference” that searches require a warrant
15
 
                                                          
 9. 670 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012).  
 10. Id. at 810. 
 11. 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (holding that police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occu-
pant’s arrest if there is reason to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the arrest’s offense). 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 13. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
 14. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948). 
 15. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (“[T]his Court has inferred that a 
warrant must generally be secured.”); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (“The 
Fourth Amendment demonstrates a ‘strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a war-
rant . . . .’” (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983))); Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (“‘Over and 
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and has even labeled unbounded police discretion in the field “evil.”
16
 
Reasonableness—the hallmark of the Fourth Amendment—is “pre-
dominantly an objective inquiry.”
17
  This is largely a fact-based exercise 
where all facts, evaluated objectively under the circumstances, are taken 
into account in deciding whether a search was reasonable.
18
  More spe-
cifically, the degree to which a search intrudes upon an individual’s pri-
vacy is weighed against the search’s furtherance of a legitimate govern-
ment interest; thus, more intrusive searches require a higher level of  
justification.
19
  Current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence strives to pro-
tect an individual’s reasonable and justifiable expectations of privacy.
20
 
B. Warrant Requirement Exception: Search Incident to Arrest 
1. Supreme Court Formation of the Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine 
The search incident to lawful arrest is one of the several exceptions 
to the warrant requirement.
21
  A search incident to a lawful arrest allows 
an officer to search an arrestee’s person and the area within the arrestee’s 
immediate control, which is defined as the space from which the arrestee 
could obtain a weapon or destructible evidence.
22
  The Supreme Court 
provided these boundaries in Chimel v. California, where it allowed the 
warrantless search of an arrestee based on concerns of officer safety and 
preservation of evidence.
23
  The search-incident-to-arrest doctrine allows 





 and containers carried on their 
                                                          
again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the (Fourth) Amendment requires adherence to 
judicial processes,’ and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval 
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” (quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 
48, 51 (1951))). 
 16. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979). 
 17. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 
531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000)).  
 18. Id.  
 19. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001). 
 20. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (collecting modern cases applying 
the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard). 
 21. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). 
 22. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009). 
 23. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
 24. Gant, 556 U.S. at 343. 
 25. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. 
  
2013] PRIVACY RIGHTS IN CELL PHONE SEARCHES 199 
person.
26
  This exception to the warrant requirement is justifiable under 
the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment because individuals 
have a reduced expectation of privacy once placed under arrest.
27
 
The search-incident-to-arrest doctrine drastically expanded after 
Chimel.  In United States v. Robinson, the defendant was subjected to a 
pat-down search subsequent to his arrest for driving with a revoked li-
cense.
28
  The search revealed a cigarette packet—a physical container—
in Robinson’s breast pocket, which the officer opened to find heroin cap-
sules.
29
  The Court validated the search and stated that an officer’s “ex-
tended exposure” while detaining and transporting any arrestee is sub-
stantial enough to permit such a search regardless of any concern for 
officer safety or preservation of evidence.
30
  Thus, officers were given 
authority to search the person of lawful arrestees—and containers on 




Soon after Robinson, the Court refined its Fourth Amendment 
search-incident-to-arrest jurisprudence relating to containers associated 
with the arrestee.  In New York v. Belton, a container was defined as “any 
object capable of holding another object.”
32
  The Court decided such 
containers may be searched whether they are open or closed.
33
  Further 
channeling Robinson’s precedent, the Court stated “the justification for 
the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, 
but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any pri-
vacy interest the arrestee may have.”
34
  The Court added that the size of 
the container was of no consequence; opening and searching any con-
tainer on the arrestee’s person or within his immediate control was rea-
sonable.
35
  As in Robinson, the Court stressed a discretion-limiting 
standard, forming a “straightforward rule, easily applied, and predictably 
enforced” to avoid litigation contemplating whether a search was justi-
                                                          
 26. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236. 
 27. United States v. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1142 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 28. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220–23. 
 29. Id. at 223.   
 30. Id. at 234–35.   
 31. Id. at 235. 
 32. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981), abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 
332, 343–44 (2009). 
 33. Id. at 461.   
 34. Id. (emphasis added). 
 35. See id. (explaining that a container may be searched even if it is not capable of holding a 
weapon or any evidence of criminal conduct relating to the suspect’s arrest). 
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fied after the fact.
36
 
2. Search Incident to Arrest Limitations 
While no restrictions were imposed on what objects can be searched 
or the justification necessary for a search incident to arrest, the Chimel 
Court still required satisfaction of temporal and spatial requirements, as 




The temporal and spatial elements of a search incident to arrest re-
quire that the search take place contemporaneously and within the “im-
mediate vicinity” of the arrest.
38
  Generally, the immediate vicinity of an 
arrest includes anything within the arrestee’s “reaching distance” at the 
time of arrest.
39
  If a search takes place outside either of these bounda-
ries, and without probable cause or a warrant, then it is per se invalid.
40
  
Recent cases suggest that, despite the liberal application of the search-
incident-to-arrest doctrine in Robinson and Belton, temporal and spatial 
requirements provide narrow avenues for limiting these searches.
41
  
Nonetheless, searches occurring later in time at the place of detention are 
generally within the temporal requirement.
42
 
Although searches incident to arrest are generally considered reason-
able, a search may be so intrusive that it becomes unreasonable and thus 
                                                          
 36. Id. at 459. 
 37. See id. at 457 (requiring the search be contemporaneous with the arrest and restricted to the 
“immediately surrounding area”); see also United States v. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1144–45 
(S.D. Fla. 2011) (discussing the temporal, spatial, and reasonableness limits of a search incident to 
arrest). 
 38. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1144 (citing Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1082 (11th Cir. 
2003) (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 465)).  
 39. Id. at 1145. 
 40. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (“[W]arrantless searches of luggage 
or other property seized at the time of an arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest . . . if the 
‘search is remote in time or place from the arrest. . . .’” (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 
364, 367 (1964))), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); see also Gomez, 807 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1144 (stating that searches incident to arrest are limited by time and space).  
 41. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 347 F.3d 280, 287 (8th Cir. 2003) (invalidating a search 
under the search-incident-to-arrest exception due to passage of time, but upholding the search on 
other grounds); Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1082–83 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that a pur-
ported search incident to arrest of a suspect’s bedroom and purse was unconstitutional because the 
search was temporally and physically remote from the arrest).  
 42. See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807 (1974) (“[O]nce the accused is lawfully 
arrested and is in custody, the effects in his possession at the place of detention that were subject to 
search at the time and place of his arrest may lawfully be searched and seized without a warrant even 
though a substantial period of time has elapsed . . . .”). 
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invalid under the Fourth Amendment.
43
  For instance, a strip search inci-
dent to a lawful arrest at the scene of arrest may be unreasonable under 
ordinary circumstances.
44
  While initially applying the search-incident-
to-arrest doctrine expansively, the Supreme Court also anticipated in-
stances where an “extreme or patently abusive” search incident to arrest 




3. Arizona v. Gant: Vehicle Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Altered 
In Arizona v. Gant, the Supreme Court returned to Chimel’s original 
justifications and adopted a new reason-to-believe standard in the context 
of vehicle searches incident to arrest.
46
  Gant was arrested for driving on 
a suspended license and was handcuffed and placed in the back of a po-
lice car while two officers searched his vehicle.
47
  The officers found a 
gun and a bag of cocaine inside the vehicle; and Gant moved to suppress 
the evidence on the grounds that the vehicle search violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights.
48
  The Court expressed concern that adhering to Bel-
ton—which allowed officers to automatically search a vehicle’s passen-
ger compartment and any containers within upon an occupant’s arrest 
without additional justification
49
—would yield an undesirable result of 
giving police officers “unbridled discretion,” implicating the “central 
concern underlying the Fourth Amendment” of protecting citizens from 
unreasonable government intrusions.
50
  The Court ultimately rejected the 
Belton holding in the context of automobile searches, citing the “check-
ered history” of the search-incident-to-arrest exception.
51
  Instead, the 
Court fell back on Chimel’s justifications and held that a vehicle search 
                                                          
 43. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1145. 
 44. See, e.g., Mary Beth G. v. City of Chi., 723 F.2d 1263, 1270–71 (7th Cir. 1983) (implying a 
strip search incident to lawful arrest may violate the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness require-
ment under ordinary circumstances if not done at the police stationhouse (citing Illinois v. Lafayette, 
462 U.S. 640, 645 (1983))); but see Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1517 
(2012) (allowing correctional facilities to invasively search detainees when being admitted pursuant 
to policy seeking to detect contraband). 
 45. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (implying “extreme or patently 
abusive” searches incident to arrest could be unconstitutional). 
 46. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
 47. Id. at 336. 
 48. Id. 
 49. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981), abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 
332, 343–44 (2009). 
 50. Gant, 556 U.S. at 345. 
 51. Id. at 350. 
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incident to arrest must be justified by a concern for officer safety, specif-
ically requiring the arrestee be “unsecured and within reaching distance 
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”
52
  Additionally, 
the Court diverged from Chimel’s rationale by authorizing a unique rule 
allowing officers to search a vehicle following an arrest “when it is ‘rea-
sonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime’” may be found.
53
  Be-
cause there was no threat to the officers and no reason to believe further 
evidence of driving with a suspended license would be found, the search 
of the vehicle was unreasonable according to the court.
54
  Notably, this 
holding applies only to vehicle searches; a full search of an arrestee’s 
person upon arrest has not been similarly altered by the Supreme Court,
55
 
but some lower courts have applied an approach similar to Gant when 
examining cell phone searches.
56
 
C. Search Incident to Arrest: Application to Cell Phone Searches 
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether a cell phone’s con-
tents may be searched incident to arrest.
57
  The Court granted certiorari in 
2010 on a similar issue regarding an employer’s search of a pager, but, to 
avoid “elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of 
emerging technology before its role in society has become clear,” the 
Court decided the case on other grounds.
58
  Recent decisions in lower 
courts reflect differing views on how to apply the search-incident-to-
arrest doctrine to cell phones.  Some courts treat cell phones as tradition-
al physical objects or containers under Belton, but a significant number 
of courts have diverged from this approach and discussed whether a new 
standard should be formulated to evaluate cell phone searches. 
                                                          
 52. Id. at 343. 
 53. Id. (quoting Thornton v. U.S., 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)).   
 54. Id. at 344. 
 55. People v. Taylor, 296 P.3d 317, 322 (Colo. App. 2012) (“[T]he United States Supreme 
Court . . . has [not] directly considered the issue of whether a search incident to arrest may include a 
search of a cell phone’s contents, and if it does, how thorough the search might be.”), cert. denied, 
No. 12SC542, 2012 WL 134432 (Colo. Jan. 7, 2013). 
 56. E.g., United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (discussing 
how police “may be justified in searching the contents of a cell phone for evidence related to the 
crime of arrest”). 
 57. Jana L. Knott, Note, Is There an App for That? Reexamining the Doctrine of Search Inci-
dent to Lawful Arrest in the Context of Cell Phones, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 445, 449 (2010). 
 58. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010). 
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1. Upholding the Search: Traditional Container Approach 
Many courts have applied the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine by 
treating a cell phone as if it were a physical object like the cigarette 
packet in Robinson or a container as described in Belton.
59
  Under either 




In United States v. Finley, the Fifth Circuit decided a cell phone can 
be searched incident to arrest in the same manner as a traditional con-
tainer.
61
  In this case, police arrested the defendant in connection with a 
controlled buy of methamphetamine and seized his cell phone.
62
  After 
transporting the defendant to a co-suspect’s residence, officers inter-
viewed the defendant regarding his past drug involvement.
63
  During the 
interrogation, the questioning officer searched through the defendant’s 
call records and text messages, several of which implicated him in drug 
trafficking.
64
  The defendant argued this evidence should have been sup-
pressed because his cell phone was like a closed container.
65
  The Fifth 
Circuit disposed of this argument with little discussion by applying the 
broad reasoning from Belton and Robinson, which states that officers 




Similar rulings apply Robinson and Belton but acknowledge that cat-
egorizing cell phones as physical objects just like cigarette packets is an 
uncomfortable analogy.  In People v. Diaz, the California Supreme Court 
cited the large amount of information cell phones are capable of holding 
                                                          
 59. E.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007) (allowing the search inci-
dent to arrest of a cell phone because the “permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest 
extends to containers found on the arrestee’s person”); People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 507 (Cal. 
2011) (stating that there is “no legal basis” for altering the scope of a search incident to arrest based 
on the character of the item). 
 60. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981) (“[A] container may . . . be searched 
whether it is open or closed, since . . . the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any 
privacy interest the arrestee may have.”), abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343–44 
(2009); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“[I]n the case of a lawful custodial 
arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.”). 
 61. Finley, 477 F.3d at 260.   
 62. Id. at 253–54. 
 63. Id. at 254.  
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 260. 
 66. Id. 
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but dismissed this fact as inconsequential.
67
  The opinion stated that “the 
high court has expressly rejected the view that the validity of a warrant-
less search depends on the character of the searched item.”
68
  Further, the 
court declared that all containers should be treated the same because dis-
tinguishing between “worthy” and “unworthy” containers would pose a 
difficult line-drawing problem.
69
  Ignoring the dissent’s assertion that 
Fourth Amendment container law had developed without current tech-
nology in mind,
70
 the court instead validated the search by treating the 
cell phone at issue like an article of clothing or cigarette package, which 




Another typical search incident to arrest case, United States v. 
Gomez, upheld the warrantless search of a cell phone but suggested 
deeper concerns about the intrusiveness and discretionary decisions in-
volved.
72
  In this drug-related arrest, the search was considered reasona-
ble under Belton and Gant because the defendant’s cell phone was within 
reaching distance at the time of arrest, and separately, the officers had 
reason to believe the phone contained evidence of the crime.
73
  The U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida analogized the phone 
to a wallet or purse—both searchable incident to arrest—but expressed 
apprehension at grouping the “ever-advancing technology of cell 
phones” with other Belton containers.
74
  Moreover, the court stated that, 
regardless of its views on technology and containers, it was obligated to 
apply the Supreme Court’s precedent.
75
  The court held that “a short, lim-
ited perusal” of a phone’s call history to gain relevant evidence was rea-
sonable, but this holding was accompanied by regret for failing to deline-
ate a clear standard for future cases.
76
  As in Diaz, the Gomez court noted 
                                                          
 67. See People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 506 (Cal. 2011) (noting that analogous Supreme Court 
precedents indicate the scope of a warrantless search is not altered by the nature of the seized item). 
 68. Id. at 507. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 516–17 (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (“The United States Supreme Court’s holdings on 
clothing and small spatial containers were not made with mobile phones, smartphones and handheld 
computers—none of which existed at the time—in mind.”). 
 71. Id. at 505–06.  
 72. 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (S.D. Fla. 2011).   
 73. Id. at 1145. 
 74. Id. at 1146. 
 75. See id. (“Even though we may disagree with the application of that post-Chimel line of cas-
es . . . we are constrained to apply the law as the Supreme Court currently pronounces it.”). 
 76. See id. at 1149 (stating that the court’s own holding contributed to the “present uneasiness” 
involved in searching cell phones incident to arrest).   
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that such a bright-line rule would be difficult to formulate in light of ad-
vancements in technology.
77
  After applying Supreme Court precedent 
and discussing the concerns involved, the court acknowledged that this 
technological problem may be best solved with technology, rather than 




Even though these decisions deem cell phone searches reasonable, 
some courts expressly recognize the existence of a threshold where such 
a search may become unreasonable.  The Gomez court, for instance, de-
nied giving officers “carte blanche” to indefinitely search every detail of 
an arrestee’s phone in light of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness 
requirement.
79
  Similarly, in United States v. Gordon, the U.S. District 
Court of Hawaii implied that police may be restricted to search only non-
computer-like contents of modern cell phones under existing precedent.
80
 
2. Denying the Search: Phones Not Treated as Traditional Containers 
Some courts have invalidated cell phone searches incident to arrest 
by rejecting the argument that cell phones are traditional Belton contain-
ers that may be searched without further justification.
81
  These opinions 
agree that the judiciary is ignoring Belton’s definition of a container, 
thereby extending Chimel beyond its intended reach.
82
  A recent opinion 
from the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected Belton’s application to cell 
phones, stating that Belton’s definition of a container excluded techno-
logical devices because Belton described a receptacle capable of storing a 
physical object inside of itself.
83
  The Ohio court also stated that cell 
phones are unlike address books or pagers—items previously ruled 
searchable—because cell phones store more information and are multi-
                                                          
 77. Id. at 1149–50. 
 78. See id. at 1150 (admitting that the court “do[esn’t] have the answer,” but suggesting the 
preliminary solution of individuals safeguarding their devices with password protection). 
 79. Id. at 1149. 
 80. United States v. Gordon, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1025 (D. Haw. 2012) (“And importantly, 
the only evidence taken from Gordon’s cellular telephone (snapshots of its call history and its con-
tact list) are not characteristics of a computer-like smart phone.”). 
 81. E.g., United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 WL 5381412, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 
2008), aff’d, 343 F. App’x 564 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Park, No. CR 05-373 SI, 2007 WL 
1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 953–54 (Ohio 2009). 
 82. See, e.g., Wall, 2008 WL 5381412, at *3–4 (stating that the cell phone search was not justi-
fied by a threat to officer safety or preservation of evidence); Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (noting 
a cell phone search “go[es] far beyond the original rationales for searches incident to arrest”). 
 83. Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 954. 
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functional.
84
  These facts gave the defendant a “reasonable and justifiable 
expectation of a higher level of privacy” in his cell phone, which there-
fore required a warrant to search.
85
 
Other courts have fallen back on the original justifications in Chimel 
and have required a threat to officer safety or the need to prevent the de-
struction of evidence to search an arrestee’s phone.  In United States v. 
Wall, the U.S. District Court of Florida noted that once a phone has been 
confiscated from the arrestee’s person, it is neither a danger to officers 
nor are its contents at risk of destruction.
86
  Based on this analysis, inves-
tigatory searches undertaken for the procurement of evidence would be 
considered unreasonable without a warrant.
87
 
Courts invalidating cell phone searches further justify this result by 
discussing the implications of a contrary ruling.  In Schlossberg v. Soles-
bee, an Oregon district court evaluated the search incident to arrest of a 
digital camera,
88
 which is similar to a cell phone search because 
smartphones incorporate camera and picture storage functions.
89
  This 
opinion declared warrantless searches of cameras—and all similar elec-
tronic devices—unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because of 
the large amount of private information stored within.
90
  Additionally, 
the court expressed unease over rulings like Gomez, which allow a lim-
ited perusal of certain information within the phone, noting the impracti-
cality of requiring officers to distinguish between searchable and non-
searchable content or devices.
91
  In United States v. Park, the court took 
this analysis a step further and discussed the “far-ranging consequences” 
of allowing such discretion, noting that an officer may still inadvertently 
encounter highly private information in the course of a limited search.
92
 
3. United States v. Flores-Lopez 
The Seventh Circuit recently upheld a warrantless search incident to 
                                                          
 84. Id. at 955. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Wall, 2008 WL 5381412, at *3–4. 
 87. Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8–9. 
 88. 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1166 (D. Or. 2012). 
 89. See, e.g., APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone/features/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) (de-
scribing iPhone’s camera feature). 
 90. Schlossberg, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1170. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (noting how a search may uncover medical records, 
personal letters, photos, and financial information). 
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arrest of a cell phone in February 2012.
93
  Although it ultimately validat-
ed the “minimally invasive” search in light of the remote risk of evidence 
destruction,
94
 the court’s discussion of phones and the search-incident-to-
arrest doctrine provides insight into future court dispositions and exposes 
issues previously unaddressed. 
a. Facts of the Case 
In Flores-Lopez, the defendant’s arrest resulted from a controlled 
drug buy in which a government informant arranged to purchase a pound 
of methamphetamine from a dealer named Santana-Cabrera.
95
  Santana-
Cabrera, overheard by the informant, called his own supplier, Flores-
Lopez, to arrange delivery of the methamphetamine to a garage.
96
  Flo-
res-Lopez arrived with the methamphetamine, and he and Santana-
Cabrera were subsequently arrested.
97
  Incident to his arrest, law en-
forcement officers seized a cell phone from Flores-Lopez’s person.
98
  
While still at the site of arrest, officers searched Flores-Lopez’s phone 
for its own number, which allowed the officers to later subpoena three 
months of call history from the phone’s service provider.
99
 
The district court sentenced Flores-Lopez to ten years in prison for 
drug-related offenses.
100
  On appeal, Flores-Lopez argued that the search 
of his phone was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because it 
was not conducted pursuant to a warrant.
101
  Thus, Flores-Lopez argued 
the call history the government presented at trial linking him to drug dis-




b. The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion 
Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner began his opinion by 
                                                          
 93. United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 94. Id. at 809. 
 95. Id. at 804.   
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 805. 
 102. Id. 
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declaring “a modern cell phone is a computer.”
103
  Next, Judge Posner 
stated that cell phones are containers because Belton’s definition encom-
passed any object that can contain another object, including electronic 
data.
104
  The opinion noted the awkwardness of comparing computers to 
physical containers for Fourth Amendment purposes and acknowledged 
that cell phone searches invade privacy to a greater degree.
105
 
Judge Posner next declined to apply Robinson’s no-justification-
necessary approach to the search incident to arrest of the cell phone by 
pointing out implied limits to the search’s reasonableness when officers 
encounter purely personal information unrelated to the crime.
106
  Using 
Robinson’s and Chimel’s justifications for evaluating the search, Judge 
Posner declared that once the phone was seized by police, there was no 
risk of harm to the officers and only a slight chance the phone’s contents 
could be destroyed by “remote wiping.”
107
  The defendant countered this 
risk of evidence destruction by stating that the police could have elimi-
nated this threat by placing the phone in a Faraday bag—a bag that 
makes remote intervention impossible by isolating its contents from net-
work and internet signals—or copying the phone’s data for preserva-
tion.
108
  Nonetheless, the court dismissed these proposed remedies as too 
burdensome on police officers.
109
  Thus, the Seventh Circuit upheld the 
search because the slight risk of evidence destruction justified the “min-
imally invasive” search for the phone’s own number “provided it’s no 
more invasive than . . . a frisk, or the search of a conventional contain-
er.”
110
  Therefore, the limited search to discover the phone’s number was 
within the boundaries of Robinson.
111
 
Judge Posner closed the opinion by tailoring the holding to the nar-
row set of facts before the court—a very limited search of a cell phone 
incident to a lawful arrest.
112
  Judge Posner listed exceptional circum-
stances that could warrant a different outcome, but stated that specific 
                                                          
 103. Id. at 804. 
 104. Id. at 805. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 106.  
 107. Id. at 806–09.  The court’s discussion of “remote wiping” involved erasing a phone’s con-
tents by either an automated wiping by a “jailbroken” smartphone or by a third party accessing the 
phone remotely.  Id. at 807–08. 
 108. See id. at 809. 
 109. Id. at 810. 
 110. Id. at 809. 
 111. Id. at 810. 
 112. Id. 
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By deciding the narrow issue presented in Flores-Lopez, the Seventh 
Circuit delivered insight regarding the current state of cell phone search-
es incident to arrest, yet left many issues open for debate.  This Section 
will begin by deconstructing the court’s rationale for upholding the 
search, highlight how searching a phone for evidence of other co-
conspirators is not authorized by Chimel, and detail how Faraday bags 
could eliminate any risk of evidence destruction.  Next, this Section will 
caution against the Supreme Court applying vehicle search principles 
from Arizona v. Gant to cell phones because of the potential for highly 
invasive searches under that precedent.  Finally, this Section proposes 
treating cell phone searches similar to home searches to better protect the  
highly private data found on modern phones. 
A. Flores-Lopez: Analyzing the Seventh Circuit’s Opinion 
1. Allowing a Limited Search Based on a Small Risk of Evidence 
Destruction 
In upholding the Flores-Lopez search based on its minimal invasive-
ness and the small risk that evidence would be destroyed, the Seventh 
Circuit essentially applied the same analysis as Gomez—a brief “perusal” 
of an arrestee’s phone for relevant evidence of the crime is reasonable.
114
  
Like the Gomez court, Judge Posner briefly discussed the boundaries in-
volved in searching an arrestee’s phone but declined to assert a standard 
that would justify a more in-depth search.
115
  Judge Posner’s opinion 
aligned with other lower courts in recognizing the vast amount of per-
sonal information stored on phones and noting the undesirable conse-




                                                          
 113. Id. 
 114. United States v. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1149 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 115. See Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 810 (stating that the circumstances that would justify a more 
in-depth search of a cell phone’s contents “are questions for another day”). 
 116. Compare United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (requiring no additional jus-
tification for a search incident to arrest), with Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1149 (limiting the scope of 
a search incident to arrest to a “short, limited perusal” for relevant evidence). 
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Yet, allowing the search based on its minimal invasiveness seems 
contrary to much of Judge Posner’s discussion.  The opinion began with 
cautionary words about the higher degree of intrusion implicit in search-
ing a cell phone as opposed to a conventional container.
117
  Judge Posner 
made clear that cell phones deserve a higher expectation of privacy than 
traditional physical containers; nevertheless, he implied the cell phone 
search at issue was “minimally invasive.”
118
  These propositions seem to 
be at odds with one another—how can the search of an object warranting 
an elevated level of privacy be “minimally invasive?”  The court dis-
counts the search’s intrusiveness by ratifying the search after the fact be-
cause only innocuous information was discovered.  This model of justi-
fying “limited” searches post hoc could lead to objectionable invasions 
of individuals’ privacy, as law enforcement officers can never know in 
advance what type of information will be exposed upon accessing a cell 
phone.
119
  Leaving this discretion to officers in the field is contrary to 
Fourth Amendment foundational principles and sounds of the “evil” 
about which the Framers and the Supreme Court have repeatedly 
warned.
120
  Instead of relying on the discretionary acts of police officers 
responding to the possibly illusory risk of evidence destruction, this situ-
ation necessitates a warrant to “interpose[] a magistrate between the citi-
zen and the police.”
121
 
Additionally, the risk of evidence destruction—the court’s justifica-
tion for the search—was likely overstated.  The court admits the possibil-
ity of Flores-Lopez or one of his cohorts remotely wiping the phone’s 
contents was “not probable,”
122
 but even this characterization was exag-
gerated.  The likelihood that a small drug ring selling their product from 
a garage would utilize remote wiping or “jail-broken” phones seems 
miniscule at best.  Even if this technology were used, the evidence would 
                                                          
 117. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 805 (“A modern cell phone . . . is quite likely to contain . . . a 
vast body of personal data.  The potential invasion of privacy in a search of a cell phone is greater 
than in a search of a ‘container’ in a conventional sense . . . .”). 
 118. See id. at 809. 
 119. See id. at 806 (“At the touch of a button a cell phone search becomes a house search . . . .”); 
see also Newhard v. Borders, 649 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (W.D. Va. 2009) (upon searching a phone 
without a warrant, police officers discovered sexual photos of arrestee’s girlfriend and shared them 
with other officers for their “viewing and enjoyment”). 
 120. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (labeling “standardless and uncon-
strained [officer] discretion” as evil and noting how previous Supreme Court decisions have “insist-
ed that the discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed”). 
 121. Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (D. Or. 2012) (quoting McDonald v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948)). 
 122. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 809. 
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still be available through other means such as the cellular provider’s da-
tabase.
123
  By allowing the search incident to arrest, Judge Posner avoid-
ed evidence suppression and aided in convicting a criminal, but even this 




2. A Cell Phone Search Leading to Arrest of Other Co-Conspirators 
The Seventh Circuit also suggested limited cell phone searches inci-
dent to arrest could help law enforcement seize co-conspirators.
125
  This 
proposition is not encompassed by either of Chimel’s original justifica-
tions—officer safety and preservation of evidence—upon which the Sev-
enth Circuit relied in Flores-Lopez.
126
  Thus, searching an arrestee’s 
phone for evidence that is not at risk of destruction or concealment vio-
lates these seminal Fourth Amendment principles because “‘the mere 
fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself 
justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.’”
127
  While seizing co-
conspirators may be a desirable result for law enforcement, Chimel’s jus-
tifications do not authorize this type of unsubstantiated rummaging as an 
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
128
 
3. Preservation of Evidence and Faraday Bags 
Judge Posner stressed the need to access a phone before its contents 
could be destroyed, but quickly dismissed the use of Faraday bags which 
could combat this risk.
129
  A faraday bag is “essentially an aluminum-foil 
                                                          
 123. See id. at 808 (“Wiped data may be recovered in a laboratory . . . .”); see also Joshua 
Earnes, Note, Criminal Procedure—”Can You Hear Me Now?”: Warrantless Cell Phone Searches 
and the Fourth Amendment; People v. Diaz, 224 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011), 12 WYO. L. REV. 483, 497–
98 (2012) (stating that the destruction of evidence rationale does not apply to phone searches inci-
dent to arrest because most data is stored by the cellular provider). 
 124. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 469 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“‘[T]he mere 
fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the 
Fourth Amendment.’” (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978))), abrogated by Arizo-
na v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343–44 (2009). 
 125. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 810. 
 126. Id. at 806. 
 127. Belton, 453 U.S. at 469 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 
393 (1978)). 
 128. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (discussing officer safety and destruc-
tion of evidence as the sole justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine). 
 129. See Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 810 (discussing the burden Faraday bags would impose on 
police officers). 
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wrap”
130
 that safeguards a phone from any remote attempts to access, al-
ter, or destroy its contents.
131
  Basically, a Faraday bag eliminates the 
phone’s ability to communicate by blocking any outgoing or incoming 
transmissions.
132
  These devices are reusable and can be purchased for as 
little as thirty dollars.
133
  Judge Posner briefly discussed Faraday bags, 
but dismissed them as possible solutions because of the burden they 
would impose on police officers.
134
  Specifically, Judge Posner pointed to 
the burden of having police “traipse about with Faraday bags” as well as 
the hassle of training officers in their use.
135
  These concerns seem quite 
misplaced.  Considering the amount of equipment already contained in 
the standard police cruiser,
136
 adding a phone-sized Faraday bag to the 
glove compartment would be trivial.  Also, the training required would 
take seconds because using a Faraday bag is as simple as inserting the 
phone and sealing the bag.
137
  Given his concern that evidence may be 
wiped remotely, it is surprising Judge Posner did not advocate the use of 
Faraday bags, as they appear to affordably and effectively eliminate any 
risk of evidence destruction. 
B. Possible Supreme Court Solution: Applying Gant’s “Reason-to-
Believe” Standard to Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest 
The “reason-to-believe” standard was originally suggested by Justice 
Scalia in a concurring opinion in a vehicle search-incident-to-arrest 
case
138
 and was adopted for such cases by the United States Supreme 
                                                          
 130. Id. at 809. 
 131. Charles E. MacLean, But, Your Honor, a Cell Phone is Not a Cigarette Pack: An Immodest 
Call for a Return to the Chimel Justifications for Cell Phone Memory Searches Incident to Lawful 
Arrest, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 37, 50 (2012). 
 132. See Mark Sutton, Faraday Bags Help Secure Seized Mobile Devices, ITP.NET (Aug. 26, 
2011), http://www.itp.net/585942-faraday-bags-help-secure-seized-mobile-devices. Faraday bags 
block “non-static electric fields such as mobile phone signals.” Id. 
 133. MacLean, supra note 131, at 50. 
 134. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 810. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Ed Grabianowski, How Police Cars Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS, 
http://auto.howstuffworks.com/police-car3.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2013) (detailing the immense 
amount of equipment carried by police vehicles). 
 137. See Simon Steggles, Phone Shield Faraday Bag—See It In Use, YOUTUBE (Apr. 11, 2008),  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FdYSj821hLo (last visited Oct. 2, 2013) (displaying the simplici-
ty and effectiveness of Faraday bags in a twenty-three second video). 
 138. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 629–32 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (justify-
ing a car search incident to arrest based on a “more general sort of evidence-gathering search” when 
there is a “reasonable belief” evidence of the crime may be found). 
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Court in Arizona v. Gant several years later.
139
  This standard goes be-
yond Chimel’s two justifications and allows searches incident to arrest 
when it is “reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest 
might be found.”
140
  Justice Scalia recommended this standard because 
the Court’s search-incident-to-arrest doctrine was “stretche[d] . . . be-
yond its breaking point.”
141
  The Court applied this approach to vehicle 
searches incident to arrest in Gant,
142
 but lower courts have also extended 
the standard to apply to cell phone searches.
143
 
When a phone search-incident-to-arrest case comes before the Su-
preme Court, the Justices may extend Gant’s holding to cell phones; that 
is, allow searches based on either of Chimel’s justifications or on a rea-
son-to-believe standard that evidence of the crime will be found.  As the 
majority in Gant permitted officers to discern on a case-by-case basis 
when a vehicle search is constitutional,
144
 it is possible that a cell phone 
search case could be handled similarly.  Some have argued this would be 
a necessary extension beyond Chimel’s justifications because cell phones 
are neither a threat to officer safety nor are their contents at risk of de-
struction.
145
  Additionally, some argue this standard would help law en-
forcement combat crime by shifting the search’s objective from evi-
dence-preservation to evidence-gathering.
146
  Also, commentators 
suggest the reason-to-believe standard would ostensibly limit the scope 




Nevertheless, the reason-to-believe standard is an unsatisfactory so-
lution to this issue because it lacks grounding in Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence and gives law enforcement officers too much discretion in 
                                                          
 139. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (“Police may search a vehicle incident to a 
recent occupant’s arrest only if . . . it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the 
offense of arrest.”). 
 140. Id. at 335.   
 141. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 142. 556 U.S. 332, 351(2009). 
 143. E.g., United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1300–01 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (drawing 
from Gant’s oral arguments, this court applied a rule similar to what the Gant Court would adopt 
soon after). 
 144. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 360 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s rule “reintroduc-
es the same sort of case-by-case, fact-specific decisionmaking that the Belton rule was adopted to 
avoid”). 
 145. Knott, supra note 57, at 474. 
 146. Id. at 475. 
 147. See id. at 473–74 (discussing various arguments in favor of the relatively restrictive Gant 
approach). 
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the field.  First, this test is not supported by any “doctrinal justification” 
because it authorizes extensive searches based on bare officer suspi-
cion.
148
  Dissenting in Gant, Justice Alito noted how this standard was 
proposed without any “explanation of its origin or justification.”
149
  
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence demands a higher degree of protection 
from the unconstrained officer discretion inherent in this standard.
150
  Se-
cond, the reason-to-believe standard’s application would likely create 
confusion.
151
  Justice Alito’s dissent in Gant remarked how the majori-
ty’s rule would “confuse law enforcement officers and judges for some 
time to come.”
152
  This standard has not been previously applied, and the 
Gant court did not define where “reason to believe” resides on the spec-
trum of probable cause and reasonable suspicion,
153
 thus adopting this 
standard would not align with Belton’s insistence on a “straightfor-
ward . . . easily applied” rule.
154
  Finally, while this solution conceptually 
limits the scope of searches incident to arrest, the as-applied results may 
still reveal highly private information because it is nearly impossible to 
discern a digital file’s relevance without viewing or reading its con-
tents.
155
  Granting officers this discretion with the unclear reason-to-
believe standard could lead to confusion in application as well as egre-
gious violations of individuals’ rights.
156
  Consequently, accessing a 
phone’s data under this standard may inadvertently reveal highly private 
information without any doctrinal support to justify the search. 
 
                                                          
 148. Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27, 49 
(2008). 
 149. Gant, 556 U.S. at 356 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 150. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (“[S]tandardless and unconstrained dis-
cretion is the evil the Court has discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of 
the official in the field be circumscribed . . . .”). 
 151. See Knott, supra note 57, at 477 (noting that confusion may ensue in lower courts because 
the Gant Court did not define “reason to believe”). 
 152. Gant, 556 U.S. at 356 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 153. Knott, supra note 57, at 477. 
 154. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459 (1981), abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 
332, 343–44 (2009). 
 155. See United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 
2007) (discussing how the potential information stored on an electronic device makes the search of 
an electronic device “substantially more intrusive” than the search of a tangible object (quoting 
United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1004 (C.D. Cal. 2006))).  
 156. See, e.g., Newhard v. Borders, 649 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (W.D. Va. 2009) (searching a 
phone without a warrant, police officers discovered sexual photos of arrestee’s girlfriend and shared 
them with other officers for their “viewing and enjoyment”). 
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C. Proposed Solution: Treat a Cell Phone Like a Residence for Fourth 
Amendment Purposes 
With the knowledge that “crafting such a specific rule for a cell 
phone is very difficult,”
157
 this Note proposes that phone searches be 
treated like home searches for Fourth Amendment purposes. Thus, a 
search of a phone’s contents would only be allowed after acquiring a 
warrant or pursuant to a carefully drawn exception to the warrant re-
quirement.  Justifying this admittedly bold standard is the fact that the 
Chimel justifications cannot be effectively applied to phones,
158
 and the 
fact that intimately private data once stored safely in the home—family 
photos, financial and medical records, love letters, and more—is now 
stored within smartphones.  This private information, regardless of the 
medium on which it is stored, deserves Fourth Amendment protection 
worthy of its confidentiality.  This standard is proposed not “to shield 
criminals” or make the phone “a safe haven for illegal activities” but “so 
that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade” an individual’s 
privacy.
159
  Applying this standard to phones will increase privacy under 
the Fourth Amendment and, while inarguably restricting police officer’s 
investigatory abilities, limit officer discretion in the field. 
1. Fourth Amendment Standard for Home Searches 
a. Home Searches: Warrant or Probable Cause with Exigencies 
Required 
The home is the pinnacle of Fourth Amendment protection: “With 
few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is 
reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no.”
160
  Absent a 
warrant or probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances, physical-
ly intruding upon the home “by even a fraction of an inch” violates the 
Fourth Amendment.
161
  Thus, if a law enforcement officer cracked open 
a door to a home without proper authorization to reveal only the “nonin-
timate rug on the vestibule floor,” that seemingly miniscule search would 
                                                          
 157. United States v. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1149 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 158. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (justifying searches of individuals for 
the purpose of finding any weapons that may endanger a police officer or seizing any evidence that 
may be concealed or destroyed). 
 159. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948). 
 160. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001). 
 161. Id. at 37 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). 
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be unreasonable.
162
  Even if a felony has been committed and officers 
have probable cause to believe incriminating evidence will be found, the 
warrantless search of a home is impermissible.
163
  Clearly, the judiciary 
has protected the home’s sanctity at every turn. 
To enter a residence, either a warrant or exceptional circumstances 
are required.
164
  Warrants must be particular and, as the Fourth Amend-
ment demands, supported by probable cause.
165
  The warrant must also 
be supported by affidavit.
166
  These requirements “stay[] the hands of po-
lice” until an unbiased third-party magistrate can decide whether to allow 
government entry into the home.
167
  Exceptional circumstances to enter a 
home exist when “compelling reasons . . . justify the absence of a search 
warrant.”
168
  These compelling reasons include emergency aid, hot pur-
suit, and the “need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.”
169
  
The emergency aid exigency applies when it is necessary for officers to 
enter in order to “render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or 
to protect an occupant from imminent injury.”
170
  The hot pursuit exigen-
cy is invoked when officers are in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect who 
enters a private residence.
171
  In addition to the three exceptions above, 
officers may also enter and search a home after a property owner—or a 
person who possesses common authority over the premises—voluntarily 
agrees to the search.
172
 
b. Applying the Home Standard to Phones 
Applying this Fourth Amendment home search standard to phones 
means that, absent exceptional circumstances, police officers would need 
to obtain a warrant to search an arrestee’s phone.  As with a home search 
warrant, a phone search warrant would need to be issued upon probable 
cause and be supported by affidavit particularly describing the items to 
                                                          
 162. Id. 
 163. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587–88 (1980) (discussing how entering a home to 
search is unconstitutional “even when a felony has been committed and there is probable cause to 
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be searched.
173
  For instance, a warrant may call for the search of a 
phone’s call history or text messages for evidence relating to a certain 
crime.  The short delay in acquiring a warrant would be inconsequential, 
as the data within the phone is generally not subject to destruction be-
cause cell phone providers store call logs and text messages off-site for 
an extended period of time.
174
  Further, the phone’s data may also be pro-
tected from destruction by using a Faraday bag.
175
 
The exceptional circumstances that justify the warrantless entry of a 
home—consent, emergency aid, hot pursuit, and the preservation of evi-
dence
176
—are not perfect fits for a cell phone, but may work in limited 
scenarios.  Emergency aid may be applicable in the context of certain 
crimes.  For example, criminals involved in kidnapping—or other crimes 
where a victim faces serious imminent danger—may have their phones 
searched incident to arrest.  In these scenarios, it is important for police 
officers to immediately access the phone’s contents in an effort to pre-
vent possible harm to a victim.  Hot pursuit, however, likely would not 
apply in the context of cell phones.  Consent would likely be the most 
common reason for a police officer to perform an on-the-spot warrantless 
search of the arrestee’s phone.  If the arrestee voluntarily consents,
177
 an 
officer would be able to search the phone to the extent the arrestee al-
lows.  However, if an exigency does not exist and consent is not given, 
the officer would have to seek a warrant to search the phone’s contents. 
2. Justification for Treating Phone Searches Like Home Searches 
The current jurisprudence regarding cell phone searches incident to 
arrest should be reworked because cell phones are not “containers” under 
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a. Phones Are Not Belton Containers 
As lower courts have stated, phones are not encompassed by Belton’s 
definition
179
 of a container for Fourth Amendment purposes.
180
  The sem-
inal Supreme Court rulings regarding searching containers incident to ar-
rest “were not made with mobile phones, smartphones and handheld 
computers—none of which existed at the time—in mind.”
181
  The 
amount of personal data one can store on an electronic device far exceeds 
that of a traditional container, which increases one’s expectation of pri-
vacy in its contents.
182
  Indeed, a person would need “large suitcases, if 
not file cabinets” to carry the physical equivalent of a phone’s stored da-
ta.
183
  Because phones can contain such a wealth of personal data, it is 
illogical to treat them in the same manner as traditional containers.  The 
cases treating phones as traditional physical containers
184
 are misguided 




b. Chimel’s Justifications Are Not Applicable to Phones 
Because a phone is not a weapon and its contents are not at risk of 
destruction, Chimel’s officer safety and destruction of evidence ration-
ales are simply not applicable to phones.
186
  Whatever remote risk a 
phone poses to officer safety is dispelled once the phone is in the hands 
of the seizing officer.
187
  Also, a phone’s data is rarely, if ever, at risk of 
destruction because the service provider stores this information, and the 
use of Faraday bags can eliminate any threat of remote tampering.
188
  For 
these reasons, Chimel cannot apply to cell phone searches incident to ar-
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rest and a different standard must be implemented. 
3. Strengths of Treating a Phone Search Like a Home Search 
The policy goals of limiting officer discretion and augmenting indi-
viduals’ privacy favor increasing the protection afforded to phones in 
searches incident to arrest. 
a. Limiting Officer Discretion 
Requiring a warrant or an exigency to search a cell phone draws a 
clear line for law enforcement in the field.  Officers would know that, 
absent clearly defined exceptions, a seized cell phone may not be ac-
cessed until a warrant is secured.  This is important because circumscrib-
ing officer discretion has been a touchstone of Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence.
189
  As an Oregon district court stated, “A primary goal in 
search and seizure law has been to provide law enforcement with clear 
standards to follow.”
190
  To accomplish this goal “[a] single, familiar 
standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time 
and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests 
involved in the specific circumstances they confront.”
191
  Obviously, be-
cause officers may encounter an infinite array of unique and possibly 
dangerous situations, the Supreme Court prefers that officers’ boundaries 
be clearly defined and easily applied.
192
  Applying this Note’s proposed 
standard—requiring a warrant or an exigency to search a phone incident 
to arrest—accomplishes this goal while also protecting individuals’ rea-
sonable expectations of cell phone privacy.  
b. Increasing Privacy for Individuals 
A rule requiring a warrant or exigency to search a cell phone protects 
a person’s expectation of privacy in the phone’s data.  This expectation 
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of privacy is “extremely high” due to the amount of personal data that a 
phone can store.
193
  This proposed standard draws a clear line to elimi-
nate the risk that an officer may rummage through an arrestee’s phone 
without a warrant and protects individuals from highly intrusive situa-
tions like Newhard v. Borders, where the police officers discovered ex-
plicit personal photos.
194
  While the circumstances surrounding some ar-
rests would permit an extensive phone search, “innocent” arrestees such 
as traffic violators should not be subjected to a phone search.  To better 
protect individual privacy, this judgment should be left to an unbiased 
magistrate rather than an officer whose duty is detecting crime. 
4. Shortcomings: Limiting Officer’s Investigatory Ability and 
Burdening Law Enforcement 
Treating cell phone searches like home searches would have short-
comings, including the investigatory limitations imposed on law en-
forcement and the added burdens involved in securing a warrant.  Un-
doubtedly, this proposed standard swings the pendulum in favor of the 
individual at the expense of law enforcement and also imposes a small—
but not insignificant—burden on police officers wishing to search a cell 
phone. 
Requiring a warrant absent exceptional circumstances limits the abil-
ity of police officers to investigate ongoing crimes, as police officers 
would not be able to immediately invade a phone’s data to retrieve in-
formation about co-conspirators or any possible crimes committed.  This 
is unlike the reason-to-believe standard that stresses evidence gathering 
at the expense of individuals’ rights.
195
  However, evidence gathering is 
not a justifiable reason to search an item on one’s person incident to ar-
rest under Chimel
196
 and is not a consideration under this Note’s pro-
posed solution. 
This limitation on police investigation is necessary because, in light 
of the Supreme Court’s insistence on clear standards for officers, the al-
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ternative option—allowing suspicionless searches of the contents of eve-
ry arrestee’s phone—is unreasonably invasive in many cases.  For in-
stance, if given carte blanche to search all arrestees’ phones, an officer 
could search the phone of an individual who is arrested for a simple traf-
fic violation, exposing all sorts of stored private information.
197
  A search 
based on these facts seems to invade one’s reasonable and justifiable ex-
pectation of privacy.  While general crime-fighting is a worthy goal, this 
type of warrantless rummaging is the discretionary evil that would erode 
the privacy rights the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.
198
  For 




Requiring a warrant for phone searches undoubtedly imposes a 
greater burden on law enforcement, but the resulting increased protection 
of privacy outweighs this burden.  Further, while officers would not be 
able to immediately search the arrestee’s phone, a warrant can generally 
be secured in the span of several hours or less.
200
  This lapse of time is a 
small price to pay so that a magistrate can weigh the need to search an 
arrestee’s phone.  Also, Judge Posner implied in Flores-Lopez that, 
should officers have to obtain a warrant, safeguarding the phone from 
remote tampering was a significant burden.
201
  This concern is misplaced, 
as countermeasures to remote tampering are easily employed
202
 and may 
be unnecessary in the first place.
203
  Requiring officers to acquire a war-
rant prior to searching a phone might impede law enforcement to a small 
degree, but preventing unreasonable searches and promoting individuals’ 
reasonable privacy interests more than justify this burden. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In Flores-Lopez, the Seventh Circuit discussed many of the issues 
involved in searching a phone incident to arrest, yet ultimately allowed 
the search based on Chimel’s destruction of evidence justification.  Judge 
Posner’s opinion noted the amount of private material that is now stored 
on smart phones, but dismissed a workable solution in Faraday bags.  By 
allowing the limited search based on a small risk to evidence, the Sev-
enth Circuit perpetuated the myth that Chimel’s justifications can be 
seamlessly applied to modern cell phones.  Cell phones pose no physical 
risk to officers and, once the phone is seized, there is virtually no risk of 
data destruction.  Therefore, a new method of evaluating cell phone 
searches incident to arrest is necessary. 
The Supreme Court’s reason-to-believe standard adds to the discus-
sion but lacks doctrinal foundation in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
The standard draws arbitrary lines and leaves open the possibility of 
highly invasive warrantless searches.  The best method of safeguarding 
individuals’ privacy interests and adhering to Fourth Amendment lan-
guage involves a standard similar to what is required for home searches, 
which necessitates a warrant or circumstances justifying an exception to 
the warrant requirement.  This standard is justifiable because phones 
contain large amounts of highly private material which was previously 
kept inside the home.  Consequently, individuals have extremely high 
expectations of privacy in their phones’ data.  Requiring a warrant also 
draws a clear line for law enforcement officers and minimizes officer 
discretion as the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed.  In summary, 
until the Supreme Court forms a rule more adaptive to modern technolo-
gy, a cell phone search incident to arrest should require a warrant or ex-
ceptional circumstances in order to best protect society’s privacy inter-
ests and eliminate unconstitutional searches. 
 
